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Abstract
In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that intervention in nature to 
aid animals is sometimes permissible, and in some cases obligatory, to save 
them from the harms they commonly face. But they claim these interven-
tions must have some limits, since they could otherwise disrupt the struc-
ture of the communities wild animals form, which should be respected as 
sovereign ones. These claims are based on the widespread assumption that 
ecosystemic processes ensure that animals have good lives in nature. How-
ever, this assumption is, unfortunately, totally unrealistic. Most animals are 
r-strategists who die in pain shortly after coming into existence, and those 
who make it to maturity commonly suffer terrible harms too. In addition, 
most animals do not form the political communities Zoopolis describes. The 
situation of animals in the wild can therefore be considered analogous to 
one of humanitarian catastrophe, or to that of irretrievably failed states. It 
matches closely what a Hobbesian state of nature would be like. This means 
that intervention in nature to aid nonhuman animals should not be limited 
as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue.
Keywords: animal ethics, animal rights, intervention, sovereignty, specie-
sism, state of nature.
1. INTRODUCTION
Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights is a novel, brilliantly argued and 
very instructive book. It addresses some of the most important topics in ani-
mal ethics in a fresh and original way, and opens new lines of inquiry. This 
paper focuses on what I consider the most significant problem Zoopolis tack-
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les: whether and to what extent we should aid animals living in the wild. This 
controversial problem has received some recent attention (Sapontzis 1984; 
Ng 1995; Bonnardel 1996; Kirkwood and Sinsbury 1996; Bovenkerk et al. 
2003; Clement 2003; Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Clarke and Ng 2006; Nussbaum 
2006: ch. 6; Dawrst 2009; Simmons 2009; Horta 2010a; McMahan 2010a, 
2010b; Palmer 2010; Cunha 2011; Torres Aldave 2011) but remains relatively 
neglected. In fact, some may be surprised by my choice of focus here, but no 
other human practice affects a larger number of individuals than our deci-
sion regarding what we owe to animals in nature.
Zoopolis claims that nonhuman animals living in the wild should be 
recognized as forming sovereign communities of their own, analogous to 
human sovereign political communities, which should be respected.1 Ac-
cordingly, like in the case of aiding other human societies, aiding animals 
in nature is sometimes permissible, and sometimes obligatory. But Zoopolis 
claims intervention must not disrupt the very structure of the assisted com-
munities, and should not be rejected by the animals involved. Also, the aim 
of such assistance should be to bring the animal community back to a state 
in which it may self-regulate without external help. In practice, this means 
supporting many forms of intervention in nature to help animals, but it rules 
out some forms of substantial intervention. So, for instance, whilst Donald-
son and Kymlicka would support vaccinating an animal population to save 
its members from a lethal epidemic, they would oppose altering trophic 
chains to avoid mass starvation, even if this could be done harmlessly (e. g., 
by supplying both food and contraceptives so that the additional food does 
not result in future starvation).
Many will find that Zoopolis overestimates our duties towards animals in 
the wild. In fact, most assume that we have no reason to aid them because 
(a) we have no such moral obligations or (b) such animals do not really need 
our help. I agree with Zoopolis’ refutation of (a) (see ch. 2, especially 24, 29, 
35), but with regards to (b) I will argue that animals in nature are in a far 
worse situation that Zoopolis assumes. Therefore, I will advocate more ex-
tensive intervention.
Zoopolis claims that nonhuman animals living in the wild should be 
treated as members of sovereign communities. The authors write:
What sort of competence is needed for sovereignty? We would argue that 
for wild animals —as indeed for humans— what matters for sovereignty 
1. It is mainly external sovereignty that Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to have in mind 
here. They do not claim that nonhuman animals are aware of themselves as sovereign com-
munities, or that individual animals must obey their communities’ legitimate institutions (171-
174). Instead, they claim that they constitute communities and that “our obligations to them are 
those of international justice, including respect for their territory and autonomy” (15). 
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is the ability to respond to the challenges that a community faces, and to 
provide a social context in which its individual members can grow and 
flourish (175).
These two conditions are not specified in detail. The authors do not, for ex-
ample, indicate the extent to which the relevant challenges must be success-
fully met by animals in nature or what kinds of social context animal com-
munities have to form. The first half of this paper discusses the first condi-
tion, the second the latter condition.
2.  WHY ANIMALS CAN SELDOM RESPOND TO THE CHALLENGES THEY 
FACE IN NATURE
The best way to examine whether animals can respond to the challenges 
nature poses to them is to see whether they can survive them. Population 
dynamics studies this. The equations used in this field to calculate how ani-
mal populations fluctuate consider basically two factors: “r”, which denotes 
the population’s reproductive rate, and “K”, which denotes an environment’s 
“carrying capacity” and so determines the survival rate of the animals in 
those populations (Verhulst 1838; MacArthur and Wilson 1967; Pianka 
1970)—. As a result, there are two main reproductive strategies in nature, 
as Donaldson and Kymlicka recognize (176-177). Some animals have very 
few descendants and invest a great deal in each offspring, whilst others in-
vest little or nothing in the survival of their offspring, but have huge prog-
enies. Now, animals of the first type, the K-strategists, are a tiny minority. 
The majority of animals (including invertebrates —which are the most nu-
merous—, fishes, amphibians, reptiles...) are r-strategists. Moreover, even 
those who look after their descendants often have very large numbers of 
eggs or offspring, which will be wasted. For, if a population remains stable, 
only one descendent per parent can survive on average. This means that 
the overwhelming majority of those animals that come to existence never 
make it to maturity. They starve to death, are killed by other animals or die 
in other ways. Because their lives are short and challenging, they experience 
almost no enjoyment. They do, however, experience a great deal of suffer-
ing, since starving or being eaten alive is normally very painful for sentient 
creatures. The lives of sentient animals thus typically contain much more 
suffering than wellbeing.
It is worth noting, moreover, that whilst some r-strategists lay hundreds 
of eggs, others, such as many fishes, lay millions of them. So, for each in-
dividual that survives, the number of individuals that come into existence 
only to suffer and die is enormous (Sagoff 1984; Ng 1995). In addition, adult 
animals do not live in paradise either. They also suffer greatly and endure 
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painful deaths due to predation, parasitism, disease, injuries, harsh weather 
conditions, hunger, malnutrition, thirst, fear and other causes (Darwin 2007 
[1860]; Dawkins 1995; Dawrst 2009). Due to all this, suffering and early death 
vastly prevail over happiness in nature. The lives of animals in the state of 
nature are like Hobbes imagined the lives of humans without states: “Poor, 
nasty, brutish and short”, usually in “continual fear and danger of violent 
death” (1981 [1651]: ch. 13).
When people think about animals in the wild, however, they tend to think 
of adult, healthy mammals rather than of all the millions of individuals from 
different species who die soon after coming into existence. The resulting, 
unrealistically rosy picture of what most wild lives are like can taint our 
judgement regarding intervention. This is a problem, I think, with the theory 
presented in Zoopolis. Donaldson and Kymlicka point out that “[a]nimals 
have evolved to survive under these conditions, and are competent to do 
so” (182). They also write that “[w]ild animals are competent both as indi-
viduals and as communities” (175). And they claim that although individual 
animals suffer and die, such suffering and death is not catastrophic, because 
the communities go on existing (176, 182).
We may say that animal populations are “competent” in the sense that an-
imal populations and species often manage to persist through time (though 
extinctions also take place). This claim, however, cannot be correct when we 
consider what ultimately matters, namely individual animals. As we have 
seen, only a tiny minority are able to survive the massive challenges that life 
in nature poses for them. The overwhelming majority fails and dies. There-
fore, they cannot be claimed to be competent in this respect. The opposite is 
true: they normally do very poorly and suffer and die in great numbers.
Zoopolis initially acknowledges that the suffering that animals experi-
ence in nature supports some interventions, and argues against the idea 
that helping animals impairs the flourishing of the aided species (see Everett 
2001). The authors claim:
To invoke the flourishing argument against all such interventions runs 
dangerously close to sanctifying natural processes as inherently morally 
good or benign. The fact that a deer’s nature has been shaped by proc-
esses of predation does not mean that the deer finds fulfillment in being 
eaten alive (165).
This suggests that opposing significant intervention in support of ani-
mals in need of aid cannot be good for animals living in the wild. The next 
section offers further reasons for this by assessing some of Zoopolis’s argu-
ments against significant intervention.
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2.1.  Sovereignty: intrinsically or instrumentally valuable? 
Donaldson and Kymlicka claim that intervention in nature is acceptable pro-
vided that it does not curtail the sovereignty of groups of animals. Explaining 
why that sort of interference would be bad for them, the authors compare in-
terfering with animal sovereignty with violations of human sovereign commu-
nities, such as the Nazi invasion of Poland, or the interventions aimed at creat-
ing new markets or controlling resources at the expense of the members of the 
relevant communities (181). Such interventions, however, are objectionable 
for reasons other than their failure to respect sovereignty: their purpose is to 
benefit those who intervene at the expense of the subjects of the intervention. 
Therefore, they are entirely unlike altruistic and beneficial humanitarian in-
terventions. So they give us no reasons to oppose interventions in cases where 
being left to one’s own devices is disastrous for the unassisted community.
We may think that significant intervention would be necessarily harmful 
for nonhuman animals because the very fact that they cannot rule their own 
destiny is intrinsically bad for them. However, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue 
against the view that ruling one’s own destiny is intrinsically valuable when 
they consider domestic animals. They present several strong arguments that 
show that there is nothing inherently bad about domestic animals’ lack of 
autonomy and depending on others (83).2 We may think that unlike domestic 
animals, animals in the wild have certain features which make the possibility 
to rule their own lives valuable. Donaldson and Kymlicka, however, do not 
claim that domestic animals lack the features that would make being able to 
rule one’s own life valuable: they argue that the life as a being who does not 
rule her or his own life can be just as fine as the life of a being that does so.3 
Zoopolis explains that depending on others can be instrumentally bad but 
denies it is intrinsically bad. It sees nothing wrong with aiding domestic ani-
mals so that they can live good lives. If this is so, however, there should not 
be anything wrong with aiding animals in nature so they can live good lives 
too.4 If sovereignty is valuable only instrumentally, not intrinsically, then it is 
not valuable when only intervention can save most individuals from suffer-
ing and death.
2. Zoopolis argues against exploiting domestic animals and explains how domestication 
can harm animals (82), but once domestic animals exist, Zoopolis sees nothing wrong with do-
mestic animals living dependent but happy, not exploited, lives.
3. Due to this, Zoopolis’s arguments not to value autonomy intrinsically apply equally to 
humans and nonhuman animals. 
4. Zoopolis rejects massive intervention to help wild animals on the grounds that it will 
turn the world into a giant zoo. This is inaccurate, however, as zoos are profit making exploit-
ative ventures where animals suffer. Instead, massive intervention would mean caring positive-
ly for animals, as in sanctuaries. And Zoopolis claims that domestic animals may live wonderful 
lives in animal sanctuaries.
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2.2.  Autonomy, flourishing, risk avoidance and preference frustration
What, then, is the reason for granting animals sovereignty? Zoopolis (espe-
cially ch. 6) appears to assume that this would allow these animals to live 
autonomous and flourishing lives. This seems very intuitive. Autonomy, 
however, can be limited not only by humans but also by other animals and 
their environment. Since remaining alive is a condition to enjoy autonomy, 
animals that die shortly after birth lack autonomy. Much the same applies to 
flourishing, which is assumed to require being able to exercise one’s physi-
cal and mental potential in good health (Nussbaum 2006: esp. 346-352) 
— something impossible if one does not live long enough. One cannot, thus, 
invoke autonomy and flourishing to oppose intervention in aid of animals 
in the wild.
Zoopolis claims that saving animals in nature from living dangerously 
would deprive them of the challenges that make their lives worth living 
(242). It argues in favor of this by saying, as an example, that sparing chil-
dren all risks impoverishes their lives. The problem with this argument is 
that we would reach very different conclusions were the chances of sur-
viving the risks much smaller than they tend to be with human children. 
For example, we would remove children from waters filled with crocodiles 
even if swimming amidst crocodiles was really thrilling for them. As we 
have seen above, this is the situation which most nonhuman animals face 
in the real world. Another argument Zoopolis considers is that intervention 
is objectionable if it frustrates the preferences of animals (see 177) or if 
the animals do not consent to it. But what if the actually resisted interven-
tions would have been accepted if the animals knew they were going to be 
good for them? Rescuing a stray dog or a trapped animal may be a hard job 
due to the resistance of the animal but most of us would claim that it is 
good for the animal. Defenders of desire-based conceptions of value can 
accept this too, since, given more information or a sharper understand-
ing, the animal would have also preferred to be aided. The animal wants 
the rescuers to go away because of fear of harm or death, rather than a 
desire to escape unaided. Thus, respecting a desire to live can sometimes 
involve intervention. But then there is no plausible account of informed 
preferences that allows local intervention (such as feeding a single starving 
animal) whilst disallowing more extensive interventions (such as feeding a 
whole population).5
5. Support for substantial intervention will also follow from an account of value based on 
mental states, according to which the only source of value (or disvalue) would be positive and 
negative experiences. On this view any intervention that increases the wellbeing of animals in 
the wild without causing greater harm will make things better for them. 
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2.3.  Intervention in situations of catastrophe
Having rejected four arguments against intervention (appealing to autono-
my, flourishing, excessive risk avoidance, and preference satisfaction) let us 
turn to Zoopolis’s conditions for permissible intervention. The intervention 
must prevent a catastrophe, leave animals in a situation such that they are 
henceforth able to exercise their sovereignty, and keep food cycles unaltered 
(182). These three stipulations, however, may not be met if the intervention 
is to succeed. Let us see why.
Given the abovementioned facts of population dynamics, animals in 
nature are in a permanent state of humanitarian catastrophe. If we follow 
Zoopolis in employing political categories to illuminate animal ethics, then 
most animals in the wild are living in irretrievably failed states incapable 
of ever being transformed into sovereign communities that respect their 
members’ interests. There is just no previous non-catastrophic state that 
might be desirable to restore. To avoid catastrophe, we need to bring about 
a completely new scenario. Furthermore, limited intervention cannot solve 
this situation, since it is due to structural features of ecosystems. Kymlicka 
and Donaldson realize this when they note that ecosystemic processes in-
volving food cycles are part of the “stable structure of self-regulation of wild 
animal communities” (182). Those stable processes are the ones that con-
demn most animals to short, dreadful lives. Like most other causes of dis-
value in nature (predation, parasitism, malnutrition, disease...) r-selection 
results from the need to compete for scarce resources. This is also what de-
termines that food cycles cause most animals to suffer and die shortly after 
coming into existence. There is no moral reason against altering food cy-
cles, when food cycles are the cause of the suffering, and there is no reason 
to restore a previously existing situation, if it was disastrous for most and a 
new one is possible.
2.4.  K-strategists
Zoopolis is most plausible in the case of some K-strategists, since their lives 
are not as bad as those of most r-strategists. However, first, K-strategists are 
extremely rare in comparison with r-strategists; second, many are not so-
cial animals that can form sovereign communities, and third, K-strategists 
have interests that conflict with those of other animals. Chimpanzees, for 
instance, sometimes hunt r-strategists, sometimes other social K-strategists 
(e. g. colobus monkeys) and sometimes wage war on each other. K- and r-
strategists, moreover, share the same habitat, and we should not fail to as-
sist r-strategists for the sake of the K-strategists’ sovereignty. Fourth, even if 
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K-strategists do better than r-strategists, they still endure terrible hardships, 
with most dying before adulthood, and suffering predation, disease, para-
sitism, injuries, hunger, and other natural factors. So there may be ways in 
which we could improve their lives.
III.  CAN ANIMALS FORM SOVEREIGN COMMUNITIES?
I have argued, pace Zoopolis, that animals do not successfully meet the chal-
lenges of living in the wild. I shall now argue that most of them do not con-
stitute sovereign communities. To be sure, some animals form communities, 
and many live in shoals, swarms, or herds. These, however, may not be polit-
ical communities. Political communities need some kind of political agency, 
even if by that we simply understand some form of decision making that 
takes place collectively or by some of the members who have the authority 
and/or the legitimacy to do so. One can be a mere member of a community, 
without being able to exercise citizenship in the sense of agency, but there 
has to be somebody who is an agent. If no one in a community exercises 
sovereignty, that is, if no one makes decisions regarding the life of the com-
munity, it is hard to see how such sovereignty can exist.
Now, some animal communities are structured societies with leaders 
that make decisions about political questions, such as where to migrate or 
when to fight or prefer flight. In these cases the second condition for sover-
eignty (that is, that animals form political communities in nature) is met, 
even if significant intervention to aid these animals is still justified for the 
abovementioned reasons. Some animals, however, both among K- and r-
strategists, live in groups that make no political decisions. They cannot be 
meaningfully described as belonging to any communities. We could argue 
that their communities are the zoonoses or biotic communities ecologists 
describe. In ecology, however, ‘community’ refers to interacting biocenoses, 
that is, groups of living beings that interact with each other and with their 
environment. This is certainly not the meaning we give to this term when 
we speak of communities in social or political philosophy, or in common 
language. We can broadly define communities as groups of interacting in-
dividuals with some kind of cohesion, common aims and some form of col-
laboration or reciprocal support.6 So the question here is whether it makes 
sense to describe non-social animals as belonging to a community. Some 
species have mutualist relations with others that benefit all the involved par-
ties. But most relations are either of commensalism, which benefits some 
but does not affect others, amensalism, with some unaffected and others 
6. For some, there cannot be a political community without a sense of community but I 
shall not pursue this line here.
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harmed, antagonism, with some benefiting by harming others (parasitism, 
predation...), or competition, which is bad for all the involved. These forms 
of interaction do not form a community any more than warring armies form 
one.7 Therefore, ecologists’ biotic communities are not the communities po-
litical theorists talk about.
Some animals display parental behavior, but family relationships — with 
the possible exception of the eusocial animals such as ants, bees, Synal-
pheus shrimps and others — are not the type of relationships that constitute 
political communities of the type Zoopolis invokes, which are more like large 
nations than like small families. Most animals do not live in the communi-
ties Donaldson and Kymlicka have in mind. They live in a state of nature in 
all the senses of the term.
4.  IS SIGNIFICANT INTERVENTION DOOMED TO FAIL?
In light of the previous sections, we should reject Zoopolis’s claim that “the 
flourishing of individual wild animals cannot be separated from the flour-
ishing of communities” (167). For most animals, the continuity of their com-
munity takes place at their expense, and many do not even live in commu-
nities. Considering the degree to which most animal lives are nasty, brutish 
and short, we should favor helping them with significant interventions.
Donaldson and Kymlicka maintain that such interventions cannot suc-
ceed (182, 288, n. 29). They also argue that if the only reason against inter-
vention is practical such a reason would not justify non-intervention but 
rather research to achieve the required knowledge in the future. They write:
Perhaps we don’t yet know how to do this, but if the only objection were 
fallibility, then we could at least be starting with small-scale pilot projects, 
in order to build up our knowledge about how to re-engineer nature so as 
to reduce suffering overall (164).
This argument seems right, and rebuts the other claims they make regarding 
the impossibility of success of substantial interventions to improve the lives 
of animals in nature. Furthermore, Donaldson and Kymlicka appear to be 
right here regarding the course of action we should currently pursue to best 
help animals suffering in the wild. Instead of intervening massively right 
now, the most effective agenda seems to be to invest our efforts in learning 
how to be able to do it successfully in the future, and carry out today only the 
practicable interventions Zoopolis supports, such as vaccinating animals 
7. Violent interactions can be part of the life of a community but a community cannot 
consist only of them. 
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from diseases, feeding animals in cases of starvation, and rescuing them in 
cases of accident. These interventions can help to spread the idea that we 
should be concerned with the harms that animals suffer in nature.
This view appears counterintuitive but its alternatives are even less ac-
ceptable. The “hands off” approach, which is unacceptable for humans, 
should also be opposed if we reject speciesism 8 or, at least, if we accept that 
the interests of nonhuman animals have non-trivial moral importance.
It is worth noting, moreover, that significant intervention to help animals 
in nature is not necessarily less feasible than the policy proposed by Kym-
licka and Donaldson. They argue that the recognition of animal sovereignty 
would entail that humans should stop building on places that are now not 
occupied by them. But we can be certain that this is not going to happen. 
Humans will keep on building roads; villages and cities will grow, mining 
activities will expand, and so on. The idea that this expansion should stop 
altogether is no less ambitious than the view that we should intervene in 
nature significantly to reduce the harms suffered by animals. In fact, it is very 
unlikely that either of these two courses of action will be fully carried out in 
the near future at least. But both are nevertheless feasible, and can actually 
inform some of the policies we may implement.
Finally, we must acknowledge that we are already intervening in nature 
in massive ways, through agriculture, industry, fishing, building or mining. 
Therefore, the dispute is about who should be the beneficiaries of our inter-
vention and why, rather than whether there could be large scale interven-
tions at all.
5.  THE QUESTION OF HABITAT PRESERVATION
Intervention to assist animals in nature may be opposed if we are concerned 
not with the interests of animals, but with ecological conservation (Sagoff 
1984; Rolston III 1992). Zoopolis explicitly reject this. It distances itself from 
the “natural law” tradition or other causes other than the interest of animals 
(especially ch. 2, sec. 2 and 3), and its subtitle indicates it defends a theory 
of animal rights — not an environmentalist theory. Some of the arguments 
invoked in Zoopolis, however, resemble environmental arguments (e. g., 289, 
n. 34).This is, I believe, due to the rosy picture of life in the wilderness that 
drives the authors’ opposition to intervention. This happens in the case of 
the idea that the reduction of wilderness harms animals (156, 160-161). It 
might be argued that wilderness destruction may harm animals if it involves 
8. Speciesism is discrimination against those who do not belong to a certain species (Hor-
ta 2010b).
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their death or reduces their wellbeing in any other way. But Donaldson and 
Kymlicka seem to think that habitat destruction is bad because it allows fewer 
animals to exist. But it is hard to see how this could be so. First, those that 
nevertheless come into existence cannot be harmed by the fact that they are 
not more numerous. It would have to be, then, the ones who never come into 
existence. But the claim that it is wrong or bad to fail to bring into existence 
potentially happy individuals is a very controversial idea in population eth-
ics (Glover 1977: ch. 4; Parfit 1984: ch. 16; Singer 2011 [1979]: 87-90). Second, 
in any case, what appears to be uncontroversial is that we should not bring 
to existence beings with lives that are expectably bad for them. And we have 
seen that in nature this is what happens in the case of most animals. Hence, 
Zoopolis’s assumption that the loss of habitats is bad for animals because it 
means that fewer animals live, although very popular and intuitive at first, is 
actually questionable and entails serious problems within population ethics.
6. CONCLUSION
Zoopolis presents a political theory that aims to give nonhuman animals the 
protection they need to be capable of having good lives. I wholeheartedly 
share this aim and applaud the authors’ effort in developing such an origi-
nal and thought-provoking theory. I also share their opposition to animal 
exploitation and their support for intervention in nature to aid nonhuman 
animals. Our views diverge when they claim that such intervention should 
be limited in certain ways. I have argued such a claim is scientifically under-
informed, and defended substantial intervention in nature.
The assumptions that animals live valuable lives in nature and that we 
lack any reasons to assist them are widespread, and so many readers will 
regard my own view as counterintuitive. I hope, however, that Donaldson, 
Kymlicka, and others will eventually come to recognize it as sound. And I 
am optimistic that they might eventually do so since the most fundamen-
tal arguments I have presented rely on empirical considerations concerning 
animal population dynamics and community ecology.
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